118. The plaintiffs (and the plaintiffs' members, subscribers, patrons, and customers) interact with and use the Internet, and cyberspace generally, in a wide variety of ways, and they are burdened by the Act in an equally wide variety of ways. Plaintiffs include content providers on the Internet, access providers to the Internet, and users of the content on the Internet. The Act burdens plaintiffs in all of these capacities. 

119. Plaintiffs who are content providers (or whose members or customers are content providers) are expressly subject to the Act. Under the Act, anyone who speaks on the Internet is a content provider. These plaintiffs do not understand what standard for indecency should be used under the Act, how the standard applies to the plaintiffs' speech, or how numerous other provisions of the Act are to be understood and applied. These plaintiffs provide content that would likely or possibly be found to be indecent as to a young child in some communities. Accordingly, they are subject to prosecution under the Act. These plaintiffs will either self-censor their speech or will continue to speak under the threat of prosecution.

120. Plaintiffs who are, or whose members are, access providers (including "Internet service providers" or "ISPs") are expressly subject to the Act. As access providers these plaintiffs enable their customers and users to use plaintiffs' facilities to link to the Internet. Although the Act provides defenses for access providers, access providers reasonably fear that these defenses will not be construed and applied as broadly as Congress intended, and they therefore fear they may be directly subject to prosecution under the Act. These plaintiffs will continue to provide access under the threat of prosecution.

121. All plaintiffs (and their members and customers) are users of the Internet. These plaintiffs and other users have a right to engage in ordinary human discourse free from the threat of prosecution created by the Act. In particular, these plaintiffs and other users have a right to receive content that is criminalized under the Act.

122. Plaintiffs AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION ("ALA") and FREEDOM TO READ FOUNDATION ("FTRF") sue on behalf of themselves, their members, who are libraries and librarians across the country, and their members' patrons. These libraries recognize that the Internet offers their patrons a unique opportunity to access information, and many libraries provide their patrons with facilities the patrons can use to access the Internet. Many libraries also have their own World Wide Web sites on the Internet. Thus, in addition to providing patrons with access to the Internet, where they can access information posted by third parties, libraries post their own material on the Internet. Many libraries post their card catalogues, post information about current events, sponsor chat groups, post textual information or art on the library Web site, or post licensed online versions of reference and other materials from their library collections. Patrons could, for example, access the Web site of a library anywhere in the country to peruse its card catalogue, review an encyclopedia reference, or check a definition in the dictionary. These libraries and librarians are injured by the Act. Because of fear of prosecution, they will be chilled from posting materials on the Internet that might be deemed "patently offensive" or "indecent" for minors by some communities. Given the global and unrestricted nature of the Internet, the lack of precision in the definition of "indecency," and the past attempts by some persons to ban literature and reference items from library collections, many of ALA's and FTRF's members may choose not to post a substantial amount of expressive material at all -- material that many adults might consider useful for themselves or their own children -- rather than risk prosecution for posting material that someone in some other part of the nation might deem "indecent" or "patently offensive" for minors. As a result of the Act, the library patrons ALA and FTRF members serve will be limited in the constitutionally protected information that would otherwise be available to them on the Internet. These plaintiffs (and their members) sue in their capacity as content providers, access providers, and users of the Internet, and on behalf of their patrons who are content providers and users of interactive computer services.

123. Plaintiffs AOL, COMPUSERVE, MSN, and PRODIGY sue on their own behalf and on behalf of their subscribers. As online service providers, these plaintiffs are content providers and access providers, and their customers are content providers and users of the Internet. These plaintiffs create content and make it available both to their customers and to the entire world of Internet users. They also allow their customers to create content on the Internet (including the creation of personal Web pages). As speakers, these plaintiffs and their customers are chilled by the Act in what they can say on the Internet and on their own online services. As access providers, these plaintiffs fear they may be at risk of prosecution under the Act for what others say. And as users, these plaintiffs and their customers are limited by the Act to the ability to access only content that is suitable for a young child.

124. Plaintiff MICROSOFT CORPORATION ("Microsoft") sues on its own behalf as a content provider, access software provider, and user of the Internet. Microsoft provides content on the Internet through MSN, on its own Web sites, and through postings, messages, and other contributions to the Internet. Microsoft's diverse content includes compilations of musical, artistic, literary and encyclopedic information, news and current events, and other content. Some of this content might be considered "indecent" or "patently offensive" in some community in the nation, exposing Microsoft to the risk of prosecution under the Act. As an access software provider, Microsoft sells or plans to sell software for accessing and exploring the Internet, for establishing and maintaining Internet servers and related services, and for creating Web sites and other Internet content. As users, Microsoft and its employees are chilled in what they can say and the frankness of their discussion in communications posted to or transmitted over the Internet, and are exposed to a risk of prosecution under the Act. Microsoft believes that the defenses provided in Section 502(2) of the Act are provided only to access providers, not to content providers and/or users, and that as to access providers, including access software providers, they are inadequate, incomplete, and expose Microsoft to potential prosecution under the Act. In addition, the chilling effect of the Act on other content providers and users of the Internet will damage Microsoft by reducing the market for access software, services software, and content- creation software.

125. Plaintiff APPLE COMPUTER, INC. ("Apple") sues on its own behalf as a content provider, access software provider and user of the Internet. Apple provides content on the Internet through eWorld, on its own Web sites, and through postings, messages and other contributions to the Internet. Because of the vagueness of the Act, Apple is uncertain whether some of this content might be considered "indecent" or "patently offensive" in some community in the nation, exposing Apple to the risk of prosecution under the Act. As users, Apple and its employees are chilled in what they can say and the frankness of their discussion in communications posted to or transmitted over the Internet, and are exposed to a risk of prosecution under the Act. In addition, the chilling effect of the Act on other content providers and users of the Internet will damage Apple by reducing the market for Internet software.

126. Plaintiff COMMERCIAL INTERNET EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION ("CIX") sues on behalf of its member Internet service providers ("ISPs") and the customers of their members. CIX members typically serve as passive carriers who offer access or transmission, and related incidental capabilities, for the Internet transmissions of others; as such they are clearly covered by the defense of § 223(e)(1). However, because of ambiguity in this defense, CIX members who operate news servers that carry USENET content are uncertain whether they may be held liable for the content of others that resides temporarily on members' USENET news servers, and is accessed by users from such servers. In addition, many CIX members also assist content providers in establishing and operating Web sites. In this capacity CIX members will often be at risk of prosecution under the Act for what others say. Due to fear of prosecution, CIX members are chilled from assisting providers of valuable content that may be deemed indecent. Furthermore, CIX members have a strong interest in the continued growth of the Internet as a means of communication, and in their subscribers' rights to free expression over the Internet. The Act undermines both interests.

127. Plaintiff NETCOM ON-LINE COMMUNICATION SERVICES, INC. ("NETCOM") sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its subscribers. As a provider of Internet access and services, NETCOM is both a content provider and an access provider. NETCOM's individual subscribers create content on the Internet, such as through the posting of personal web pages, and make that content available both to their own customers and to the entire world of Internet users. As speakers, NETCOM and its subscribers are chilled in what they can say on the Internet and on their own Internet sites. As an access provider, NETCOM cannot control what others say, yet faces the risk of prosecution under the Act for the speech of others made available through its systems. As users of the Internet, NETCOM and its subscribers are limited by the Act to accessing and producing only content that is suitable for a young child.

128. Plaintiff OPNET, INC. ("OpNet") sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its subscribers. As a provider of Internet access and services to subscribers, OpNet faces uncertainty as to the applicability of the Act's defenses. OpNet also fears that it will be construed to have liability for content posted by third parties through its systems.

129. Plaintiff INTERACTIVE SERVICES ASSOCIATION ("ISA") sues on behalf of its members, who include the major commercial online services, and other content providers, access providers, and users of the Internet. As with the online services, ISA's members risk prosecution for engaging in, or serving as a conduit for, constitutionally protected speech that might be deemed indecent. Accordingly, the Act will chill ISA members from exercising their First Amendment rights.

130. Plaintiff ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS ("AAP") sues on behalf of its members, who are content providers on, and users of, the Internet. Although rooted in print publishing, AAP's members are very actively involved in the Internet. AAP's members create electronic products to accompany and supplement their printed books and journals; create custom educational material on the Internet, publishing on and to demand; communicate with authors and others, receiving manuscripts, and editing, typesetting, and designing books electronically; transmit finished product to licensed end-user customers; communicate with bookstores and other wholesale and retail accounts; and promote authors and titles online. Many of AAP's members have Web sites and provide content to the world on the Internet. Some of the content provided by AAP's members might be considered "indecent" or "patently offensive" for minors in some communities (as most of the efforts to ban books in communities have been directed at books published by AAP's members).

131. Plaintiff AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS ("ASNE") sues on behalf of its members, who are editors of daily newspapers throughout the United States that, in addition to publications in print form, are now or soon will be published in electronic formats available to the public on the Internet or through online service providers. Historically, the First Amendment guarantee of "freedom of the press" has protected newspapers from government-imposed content restrictions which, like those in the Act, prohibit and punish the dissemination of materials considered "indecent" or "patently offensive" with respect to non-adult readers. By its terms, however, the Act can be applied to the press in the same manner that it can be applied to any other person. ASNE members, who make the editorial decisions regarding what content will be published in the daily editions of their newspapers, are concerned that the Act will require them to censor the online version of their print editions according to these vague and overbroad statutory standards, thereby restricting the content of the "electronic" edition of the daily newspaper in ways that the First Amendment does not tolerate with respect to the traditional hard-copy print edition. For this reason, ASNE believes the Act imposes an unprecedented but very real threat of unconstitutional press censorship which could throttle the Internet's potential to greatly enhance the diversity, availability, timeliness, quality, and utility of daily newspapers by creating a powerful disincentive for publication through the use of interactive media technologies.

132. Plaintiff NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA ("NAA") files this lawsuit on behalf of its members, a majority of which are daily newspapers in the United States. Approxi- mately 175 daily newspapers in North America are currently available on the Internet, via commercial online services or through local bulletin board services. As content providers, newspapers have utilized the Internet to provide electronic versions of their printed product. In fact, many newspapers provide archives of their print product online. As access providers, newspapers have established electronic forums for local communities to communicate and to conduct business. While the content in newspapers is considered neither indecent nor patently offensive when published on newsprint, it now may be when published electronically. The dual standard imposed by the Act will force newspapers to edit out content from publications offered on the Internet -- content that is constitutionally protected and not subject to challenge in printed form. In many cases, newspaper publishers will be forced to edit content contained in the archived electronic version of the newspaper already placed on the Internet long before the Act went into effect. Thus, the Act will seriously infringe upon the rights of NAA members to publish constitutionally protected news and information.

133. Plaintiff ASSOCIATION OF PUBLISHERS, EDITORS AND WRITERS ("APEW") sues on behalf of its members, who write and publish in print and online. Members of APEW include the San Francisco Guardian, the largest and oldest independently owned alternative newsweekly in the United States; the Internet Press Guild, an unincorporated association of writers, authors and journalists who publish their works online; the California First Amendment Coalition, a nonprofit, public interest corporation whose membership comprises approximately 700 individuals and organizations, including most of California's daily newspapers, many weekly and student newspapers, broadcasters, law firms and others; and individual writers and editors including Jim Warren, a columnist and advocate for open government, and owner and editor of the listserv GovAccess; Professor David Farber of the University of Pennsylvania; John Quarterman, a columnist and Secretary of Matrix Information and Directory Services, Inc.; T. Bruce Tober, a freelance writer who researches and writes about the Internet for a variety of print and online publications; Stephanie Stefanac, Editor of MacWorld Online, a monthly trade publication for users of the Macintosh computer manufactured by Apple Computer Co.; and Rogier van Bakel, a Contributing Editor to Wired Magazine. The members of APEW face criminal prosecutions under the Act for the online publication of works which some communities might find "indecent" or "patently offensive." The vagueness of the Act leaves APEW members uncertain whether the publication of their works over the Internet would be a crime.

134. Plaintiff SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its members. The Society's membership produces a tremendous volume of content made available over the Internet: news stories, special interest articles, columns, and opinion pieces, among many others. Each year brings a dramatic increase in the importance of electronic media as a venue for distributing the news and opinion pieces produced by professional journalists. The members of the Society fear that their right and ability, traditionally protected by the First Amendment, to engage in an unfettered marketplace of ideas and expression will be severely compromised by the Communications Decency Act. In addition, the Society operates a listserve called "SPJ-L," a forum among more than 1,000 Internet users (both Society members and non-members) from roughly 25 countries to discuss and debate primarily journalism-related issues. Though, or perhaps because, it typically addresses topics of the utmost seriousness and importance for journalists, the language used in messages posted on SPJ-L can be offensive, harsh, and vulgar. The Society does not edit these messages for content. By continuing to provide this forum for discussion and debate, the Society risks prosecution under the Act. Its members, whose writings and other speech would be protected by the First Amendment in the context of other media, will be chilled by the Act from engaging in constitutionally protected speech over the Internet.

135. Plaintiff HOTWIRED VENTURES LLC ("HotWired Ventures") sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its subscribers. HotWired Ventures operates an online magazine named Hotwired. Some of HotWired's editorial content might be considered "indecent" or "patently offensive" for minors in some communities. HotWired features articles containing facts about and opinions on popular culture. These articles sometimes contain vulgar language and references to, inter alia, sexual acts and sexual organs. One area of HotWired's editorial focus is cyberspace-related issues, including governmental attempts to censor and regulate the Internet. These articles sometimes employ vulgar language in expressing opinions about this topic, and may contain references to, and discussions of, examples of material that might be deemed "patently offensive" or "indecent" under the Act. In addition, HotWired operates a regular section called Piazza, an interactive discussion area where members can communicate with each other both through asynchronous postings called "threads" and in real time "chat rooms," sharing opinions and engaging in outspoken discourse which can involve vulgar language and may involve sexually explicit subject matter. Plaintiff WIRED VENTURES, LTD. ("Wired Ventures") sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its subscribers. Wired Ventures publishes Wired Magazine, a print publication. Like HotWired, Wired publishes articles and short fiction that sometimes contain vulgar language and references to sexual acts or sexual organs. Many articles published in Wired are also published online by HotWired. Thus, some articles that are perfectly legal for minors or adults in print form are nevertheless banned from the Internet. The Act creates the anomalous situation that a publication that is a leading commentator on issues and events online may not under the Act be able to publish online articles about the Internet that can be published in print. HotWired Ventures and Wired Ventures believe that the Act would severely infringe their right to publish constitutionally protected material and their readers' right to choose to read such material.

136. Plaintiff AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS ASSOCIATION ("ABA") sues on behalf of its member bookstores (as content providers and users) and their patrons (as users of the Internet). Although ABA's members are not "adult bookstores," many of ABA's members sell materials that deal frankly with the subject of human sexuality. Some member bookstores have their own Web pages that discuss the content of books the stores sell. Most member bookstores use the Internet and electronic communications to obtain information and excerpts of books from publishers. ABA members' right to learn about, acquire, and distribute constitutionally protected materials, and their patrons' right to purchase such constitutionally protected materials, will be seriously infringed by the Act.

137. Plaintiff FAMILIES AGAINST INTERNET CENSORSHIP ("FAIC") is a national organization of parents dedicated to the proposition that they, not the government, should decide what their children should be able see or receive. FAIC sues on behalf of its members. As parents, FAIC's members are deprived of the opportunity to raise their children as they see fit. As users of the Internet, the Act violates FAIC's members' rights to receive material suitable for adults.

138. Plaintiff CITIZENS INTERNET EMPOWERMENT COALITION ("CIEC") sues on behalf of its members as content providers, access providers, and users of the Internet. In particular, CIEC and its members are injured because the Act deprives parents of the ability to determine the content their children, including older teenagers, should have access to on the Internet.

139. Notwithstanding the defenses set forth in the Act, and the fact that Congress expressly directed courts to construe those defenses broadly, plaintiffs reasonably fear prosecution under 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B), as enacted by Section 502(2), for knowingly permitting their services or computers to be used to display indecent material in a manner available to persons under age 18, or to transmit such material to specific persons under age 18. Unless and until the defendants or the Courts make clear that these defenses must be broadly construed, there is nothing to prevent an aggressive prosecutor, in a particularly intolerant community, from bringing a prosecution and urging that the defenses be construed more narrowly than plaintiffs believe Congress intended.

140. For these reasons, plaintiffs reasonably fear that the defense in 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(1) may not protect online service providers from criminal conviction for indecent expression by third parties when that expression is located on the providers' computers (such as when an individual computer user posts a vulgar message to an online discussion). Plaintiffs reasonably fear that the defense may apply only to the extent an online service acts as a mere conduit to enable its subscribers to gain access to another network.

141. The speech at issue in this case is fully protected by the First Amendment. "Indecent" speech or "patently offensive" communications, while considered by some to be offensive or sexually suggestive, are not obscene. Such speech can have serious literary, artistic, political or other merit, and thus has considerable value to adults and to society as a whole.

142. The Internet, and cyberspace generally, carries a significant amount of communications, images and text that might be deemed inappropriate, "indecent" or "patently offensive" for younger children (for example, in elementary school), but which would not, under the same community standards, be deemed inappropriate, "indecent" or "patently offensive" for older minors (for example, in high school or early college). The Act makes no distinction between these age groups, and would criminalize a university professor's distribution -- using the university's interactive computer service -- of "indecent" but classic works of literature to a 17-year-old freshman.

143. Dissemination of many of the same communications whose dissemination via interactive computer services is made criminal by the Act would not be unlawful if disseminated by traditional print media (e.g., newspaper or magazine) or by using the United States mail. Thus, many of the very same communications the Act makes it unlawful to make available to minors through interactive computer services can lawfully be made available through other media, and are, in fact, so available.

144. Any government regulation of "indecent" or "patently offensive" speech may withstand constitutional scrutiny only if it both serves a "compelling interest" and is "the least restrictive means" to advance that interest, and only if the benefit gained from the Act outweighs the loss of constitutionally protected rights.

145. The government has no legitimate, much less "compelling," interest in preventing adults from sending or receiving "indecent" or "patently offensive" speech. The government has no legitimate, much less "compelling," interest in preventing older children from sending or receiving speech that would only be deemed "indecent" or "patently offensive" if communicated to younger children.

146. One legitimate interest the government does have -- and the only interest articulated in the Act (§ 509, to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230) -- is to assist parents in supervising their children's access to expressive materials. The Act does not, however, further that interest. Indeed, the Act interferes with that interest because parents who decide their children, whether 7 or 17, should have access to some materials that some community might deem "indecent" or "patently offensive" for those children are prevented from exercising their parental judgment by the Act's blanket prohibition on all access by all persons under 18 to all such materials.

147. Even if the government had a legitimate interest, more broadly, in preventing interactive computer service access by all persons under 18 to communications that some community might deem "indecent" or "patently offensive" to them, the Act would not materially further that interest. Among other things, communications of foreign origin are freely accessible on the Internet, and the United States government has no means to prosecute foreign content-providers for violation of the Act, or to deter such postings. Furthermore, existing statutes and other provisions in the Act already prohibit the use of computers to disseminate obscenity, child pornography, harassing speech, enticing or luring minors into inappropriate activities, and other speech that is not protected even for adults.

148. Even if the Act could be viewed as substantially furthering a compelling governmental interest in protecting minors from "indecent" or "patently offensive" communications, it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. The screening and blocking tools described above achieve that interest far more effectively than does the Act itself, and with no adverse impact on the constitutional rights of adults. Efforts by government to spur the further development of such tools would further the claimed governmental interest more directly and materially than does the Act.

149. Even if the Act could be viewed as the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest in protecting minors from "indecent" or "patently offensive" communications, any benefit gained from the Act would be far outweighed by the loss of constitutionally protected rights of adults, because only some applications of the Act will in fact protect minors, but every application of the Act will punish or deter speech that is constitutionally protected for adults.